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This paper applies a life-cycle model with individual income uncertainty to investigate
the determinants of credit to households. We show that the value of household credit
to GDP ratio depends on (i) the lending-deposit interest rate spread, (ii) individual
income uncertainty, (iii) individual productivity persistence, and (iv) the generosity of
the pension system. Subsequently, we provide empirical evidence for the predictions of
the theoretical model on the basis of data for OECD and EU countries.
Keywords: Household credit; life cycle economies; banking sector.
JEL classi¯cation: E21, E43, E51.Non-technical summary
Economic policy makers, macroprudential supervisors or investors are interested in reli-
able estimates of the equilibrium level of credit in the economy. While earlier theoretical
and empirical studies concentrated mostly on the aggregate level of credit to the pri-
vate sector or the value of corporate credit, more recent studies focus on the problem
of credit to households. In this paper we contribute to this discussion by proposing
a life-cycle model with individual income uncertainty that can be used to assess how
various macroeconomic factors a®ect the equilibrium value of household credit.
The model describes the behaviour of consumers, which are heterogeneous in terms
of age, income and ¯nancial assets. They maximize the utility from consumption sub-
ject to the life-cycle budget constraint. Their savings are remunerated at the deposit
interest rate and the cost of borrowing is given by the lending rate. When young, con-
sumers work and receive wages that depend on an idiosyncratic, stochastic component
and a deterministic life-cycle pro¯le of productivity. When old, they are on a manda-
tory retirement and receive pensions. The government collects taxes, pension system
contributions and accidental bequests, and spends on public consumption, pensions
and transfers. Perfectly competitive ¯rms produce homogeneous goods using capital
and labour as inputs.
The model is calibrated at annual frequency to match some characteristics of the
US economy. Subsequently, it is solved so that we can compute the equilibrium level of
capital, interest rates, or the aggregate level of credit to households. In the benchmark
parameterization the credit to GDP ratio equals to 14% and resembles the level of
consumer credit in developed economies. In the next step, we analyze how the level of
credit to households depends on the parameterization of the model. We show that its
value reacts to changes in the lending-deposit interest rate spread, individual incomeuncertainty and persistence, and the generosity of the pension system. A larger spread,
higher income uncertainty or persistence, and increased pensions all reduce the level of
credit in relation to GDP.
As a robustness check, we estimate the econometric models approximating the long-
run relationship between credit to households and the above mentioned factors. On the
basis of aggregate cross-sectional and panel data for OECD and European Union (EU)
countries, we ¯nd some empirical support for the predictions of the theoretical model.1 Introduction
Economic policy makers, macroprudential supervisors or investors need reliable empiri-
cal estimates of the equilibrium level of credit in the economy. When the level of credit
is low, high dynamics of credit might re°ect an adjustment to the equilibrium, ¯nancial
deepening in emerging economies for instance. When the level of credit is high, even a
one-digit growth rate of credit may be considered excessive. Deviations of credit from
its equilibrium often lead to a widening of macroeconomic imbalances, e.g. rising in°a-
tion, asset bubbles, ine±cient booms and bursts or instability of the ¯nancial system.
Moreover, banks are also interested in the relationship between their credit policies and
the state of the economy, since macroeconomic instability caused by excessive credit
supply usually hits them back by deteriorating their assets. This, in turn, may even
cause a banking crisis.
The issue of the equilibrium level of credit in the economy is addressed in the liter-
ature from di®erent perspectives. Several papers use theoretical models to analyze the
equilibrium level of credit over business cycles by identifying phases of credit rationing
or credit booms (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Azariadis and Smith, 1998; Lorenzoni,
2008). In the similar spirit, DSGE models have been used recently to analyze the
asymmetry in the behavior of borrowers and lenders in reaction to structural, and in
particular ¯nancial shocks (Iacoviello, 2005; Gerali et al., 2010).
The other group of articles is rather empirical in nature and estimate a long-run
relationship between the aggregated value of credit and a set of standard macroeconomic
factors such as output, prices or interest rates. The main ¯nding of these studies is that
for most countries the value of credit tend to increase with GDP and asset prices, and
to decrease with the level of interest rates (see Egert et al., 2007 and references therein).
While earlier theoretical and empirical studies mostly concentrated on the aggregate
level of credit to the private sector or the level of credit supplied to ¯rms, more recent
1research touches the problem of credit to households. A number of studies investigate
credit markets in a general equilibrium framework, taking into account a default risk,
idiosyncratic uncertainty and life-cycle pro¯le of income (Lawrance, 1995; Ludvigson,
1999; Athreya, 2002; Chatterjee et al., 2007; Livshits et al., 2007).
Our aim is to contribute to the above literature by proposing a life-cycle model with
individual income uncertainty that can be used to assess how various macroeconomic
factors a®ect the equilibrium value of household credit. We show that its value de-
pends on (i) the lending-deposit interest rate spread, (ii) individual income uncertainty,
(iii) individual productivity persistence, and (iv) the generosity of the pension system.
Subsequently, on the basis of aggregate data for OECD and European Union (EU)
countries, we ¯nd some empirical support for the predictions of the theoretical model.
In the context of discussion on early warning indicators of ¯nancial instability, the
results from our work can be used to construct an equilibrium level of credit for the
economy. Such equilibrium value of credit will be driven by a number of macroeconomic
factors discussed in this paper. While the usual methods to identify credit booms rely
on simple statistical ¯ltering procedures (e.g. the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter), deriving the
equilibrium level of credit in our model makes it possible to compute "credit gaps"
related to deviation of credit from that equilibrium.
Our study constitutes a basis for further analyses of the equilibrium level of credit
in the economy and investigations of ¯nancial stability. In order to prove this, we note
that the econometric analysis in this article have been replicated and extended by Serwa
(2011) to build a model identifying both normal and boom regimes in the credit market.
In turn, Rubaszek (2011) have calibrated a version of the model including housing to
data on the banking sector in Poland. His results suggest that incorporating housing
in the model signi¯cantly increases the volume of credit in the economy. As we argue
in the last section of the paper, the model can also be expanded further to account for
2credit risk or other forms of ¯nancial instability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the life-cycle model
we use for our simulations. Section 3 describes the benchmark parameterization and
solution of the model. Section 4 contains the results of simulations aimed at detecting
the determinants of household credit. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. The
last section discusses areas for future research.
2 The model
In this section we present a dynamic, life-cycle general equilibrium model with individual
income uncertainty, which in many aspects is similar to that developed by Huggett
(1996). The novelty of our model is that it includes banks that di®erentiate between
rates for deposits and loans. The detailed structure of the model is as follows.
2.1 Consumers
Each period, which corresponds to one year, a new generation of consumers is born. The
duration of each consumer's life is uncertain. The exogenous probability of surviving
to age j + 1 conditional on surviving to age j, which is the same for all individuals, is
equal to sj, where j 2 J = f1;2;:::;Jg. Death is sure after period J, which means
sJ = 0. The resulting unconditional probability of surviving till age j at time of birth
amounts to Sj = Sj¡1sj¡1 for j 2 J=f1g, where S1 = 1.
Population is growing at an annual gross rate ° and thus the population of cohort
j is Nj = Sj°¡(j¡1), where the population of the newborn cohort is normalized to one,
N1 = 1. Consequently, total population amounts to N =
P
j2J Nj.










where ¯ is the time discount factor and E0 is the expectation operator conditional on
information available at the beginning of period 1.
The life of individuals consists of two parts.1 During initial J1 years they partici-
pate in the labor market by suppling a ¯xed part of their available time ¹ l and receive
renumeration:
y(j;e) = (1 ¡ ¿w ¡ ·)w¹ lzj(e) for 1 · j · J1: (2)
Here ¿w is the income tax rate, · denotes the social contribution rate and w stands
for real wages. The term zj(e) describes individual productivity that depends on age j
and idiosyncratic productivity e. The age component of productivity is deterministic,
whereas the idiosyncratic component e is stochastic and takes one value from the set
E = fe1;e2;:::;eMg. This component follows a Markov process with a transition matrix
¼, so that the vector of probability states follows:
p(e
0) = ¼p(e): (3)
It can be noted that since productivity shocks are independent across agents, the uncer-
tainty at the individual level does not lead to aggregate uncertainty over labor supply.
In the second part of life individuals are on mandatory retirement and receive pen-
sions:
y(j;e) = b for j > J1 (4)
1Persons under working age are excluded from the analysis
4that do not depend on age, individual productivity or earnings history.2
Individual income can be spend on consumption c or saved in the form of bank
deposits that pay a rate rd(1¡¿r), where ¿r is a capital tax rate. Moreover, individuals
are allowed to borrow from banks at a rate rl;j that depends on age due to reasons
discussed in the next subsection. We do not impose any limits on the amount of debt,
but the terminal condition stating that if an individual survives till the terminal age J,






a(1 + rd(1 ¡ ¿r)) + y(j;e) + tr ¡ c for a ¸ 0
a(1 + rl;j) + y(j;e) + tr ¡ c for a < 0
(5)
where a0 is net ¯nancial position (net worth) in the next period and tr denotes transfers
from accidental bequests.
The value function of an individual at age j with the individual state x = (a;e) is





subject to (2)-(5) and conditions stating that net worth is null at birth and after period
J .
2.2 Banks
The banking sector is perfectly competitive. Banks are maximizing pro¯ts from granted
loans cr and collected deposits dep, for which net real interest rates are equal to rl and
rd, respectively. The di®erence between collected deposits and granted loans is covered
2This assumptions can be viewed as an approximation of a redistributive pay-as-you-go pension
system. Moreover, it eases the computational burden since a variable capturing an individual's earnings
history needs not be included in the consumer optimization problem.
5by participation in the bond market, where funds can be raised or deposited at rate r.
Pro¯ts of a representative bank are equal to:
Pb = (rl ¡ r)cr + (r ¡ rd)dep ¡ ª(cr;dep); (7)
where the cost function is assumed to be of the linear form: ª(cr;dep) = ª1cr+ª2dep.
As a result, expression (7) is maximized for:
rl =r + ª1
rd =r ¡ ª2:
(8)
While taking loan an individual is obliged to insure against the risk of unexpected
death, in case of which her loan is not repaid. The resulting real lending rate for
individuals at age j amounts to:
rl;j = rl + (1 ¡ sj)(1 + rl): (9)
In the case of unexpected death of a depositor, her deposit is taken by the government
and equally distributed among all individuals in the form of transfers.
Two things should be noted. First, we justify the existence of the interest rate spread
solely by ¯xed costs and the probability of death, whereas in reality other factors are
also signi¯cant (see e.g. Saunders and Schumacher, 2000 for an extended discussion).3
Second, the above speci¯cation implies null pro¯ts of the banking sector.
3One important factor is the risk of default. Under assumption that all borrowers are subject to
the exogenous probability of default (known a priori with certainty at the aggregate level), and all of
them insure fully against that risk by paying the appropriate premium to the bank, the spread will
also contain the default insurance.
62.3 Firms
The goods market is perfectly competitive. Identical ¯rms of measure one are producing
a homogeneous good Y using e®ective labor L and capital K:
Y = F(K;L): (10)
We assume that F is strictly increasing and concave in both inputs, obeys the Inada
conditions and is characterized by constant returns to scale.
E®ective labor, which is hired from households, is remunerated at a gross wage w.
In the case of capital, ¯rms are ¯nancing its purchase by participating in the bond
market, where funds can be raised at the real rate r. Moreover, the capital depreciates
at an annual rate ±. Consequently, pro¯ts of a representative ¯rm amount to:
Pf = Y ¡ wL ¡ (r + ±)K: (11)
This expression is maximized if factor prices are equal to their marginal products:




The role of the government is threefold. First, it collects taxes to ¯nance public expen-
ditures G, where it is assumed that the central budget is balanced:
G = ¿r(rdDep) + ¿w(wL): (13)
The second role is to supervise the pay-as-you-go pension system, which collects
contributions from workers and distributes them equally among retirees. The retirement
7b is not related to earnings history, but equals to a fraction of the average net wage w:
b = µw; (14)






Finally, the government is responsible for collecting accidental bequests, the aggre-
gate value of which amounts to B, and distributing them in the form of transfers. The





2.5 Aggregation and stationary equilibrium
In this subsection we will discuss a concept of stationary equilibrium of the model econ-
omy. We start by de¯ning aggregate variables. Then, we present stationary equilibrium
conditions.
Given the heterogeneity across individuals in terms of age j and the individual state
x = (a;e), we need some measure of the distribution. Let (X;B;Áj) be a probability
space, where X = < £ E is the state space, B is the Borel ¾-algebra on X and Áj a
probability measure. For each set B 2 B the share of individuals with x 2 B in total
population of cohort j is given by Áj(B). Since individuals are born with no assets nor
debt, the distribution Á1 is given exogenously by the initial distribution of productivity
u. To calculate the remaining distributions Áj we need to de¯ne a transition function
Qj(x;B), which describes the probability that an individual at age j with the current





Qj(x;B)dÁj; for all B 2 B: (17)
Finally, let us de¯ne cj(x) and a0
j(x) as policy functions of individuals at age j for con-
sumption and next-period asset holdings. The aggregate variables, which are consistent

































j(x)(1 + r(1 ¡ ¿r))dÁj
A stationary equilibrium is de¯ned as the policy functions of individuals cj(x) and
a0
j(x), labor and capital demand of ¯rms (K and L), factor prices (w and r), transfers
(tr), tax rates (¿r and ¿w) and government spending (G), social contribution rate (·)
and the value of pension (b), as well as distributions fÁj : j 2 Jg, that ful¯ll the
following conditions:
1. The policy functions cj(x) and a0
j(x) are optimal in terms of the optimization
problem given by (6).
2. Factor prices are equal to marginal products given by (12).
4A detailed description of the conditions that need to by satis¯ed by the transition function are
given in Rios-Rull (1997)
93. The goods market clears: F(K;L) = C + G + K0 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)K.
4. Capital stock per capta is constant: K0 = °K.
5. The government budget is balanced (eq. 13).
6. The budget of the pension system is balanced (eqs. 14 -15).
7. Aggregate transfers are equal to accidental bequests (eq. 16).
8. Distributions Áj are invariant and consistent with individual behavior.
2.6 Solution of the model
We start the computation of the stationary equilibrium by discretizing the space for net
¯nancial position a over grid points A = fa1;a2;:::;amg. We set the bounds a1 and am
at levels not constituting a constraint on the optimization problem. This means that
these values are never chosen by individuals as next period asset holdings. The number
of grid points is chosen to be m = 701, but we do not restrict the choices to lie in the
grid, but use interpolation to cover any intermediate choices.
The algorithm is as follows (see Huggett, 1996 or Heer and Maussner, 2005, p. 390):
1. Set the initial value of K.
2. Compute r and w with (12) that are consistent with K.
3. Solve the Bellman equation (6) by backward induction and compute the value
function Vj(x) and policy functions cj(x) and a0
j(x) for (x;j) 2 A £ E £ J.
4. Given the initial distribution Á1, which is known, compute distributions Áj for
j > 1 by forward induction.
5. Compute next-period capital stock K0.
106. In case of convergence (K0 = °K) stop. Otherwise repeat from step 2 with the
value of K from the last iteration.
All computations were done with Gauss codes of Heer (2004), which we translated to
Matlab and extended.
3 Parameterization and solution of the model
3.1 Parameterization
The model frequency is annual and its parameters are calibrated partly on the basis of
the relevant literature and partly so that the stationary equilibrium matched selected
long-run averages for the US economy. The benchmark parameter values are displayed
in Table 1.
We assume that individuals become economically active at age 20, work for max-
imum 43 years, and at age 63 go for mandatory retirement that lasts up to 28 years.
This means that the model describes the behavior of J = 71 cohorts of age from 20 to
90. The conditional survival probabilities sj, which are taken from U.S. Census Bureau
(2009, Sec. 2, Tab. 105), are presented on the left panel of Figure 1. The population
growth rate is ¯xed at 1% per year (° = 1:01), which re°ects the US 1980-2008 average.
The resulting share of retirees (aged 63-90) in total population (aged 20-90) amounts
to 24.7%. This compares to the observed ratio in the US of about 20% in 2008 and the
projected ratio of about 25% in 2020 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, Sec. 1, Tab. 7-10).
Individuals spend 30% of their time available at work (¹ l)5 and derive utility from
5On the basis of the American Time Use Survey: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nr0.htm.






1¡´ for ´ 6= 1;´ > 0
lnc for ´ = 1:
(18)
The value of the relative risk aversion coe±cient ´ is set to 2, which is in the middle of
the range commonly used in the literature. The discount factor ¯ is ¯xed at a standard
value of 0.98.
The idiosyncratic productivity zj(e) is assumed to be of the form:
zj(e) = ¹ zj £ e; (19)
where ¹ zj describes a deterministic age-pro¯le of productivity and the logarithm of e
follows an AR(1) process:
lne
0 = ½lne + "; " » N(0;¾
2
"): (20)
The values for ¹ zj, which are presented on the right panel of Figure 1, are taken
from Huggett (1996).6 The ¯gure shows that the median productivity7 is initially low,
amounting to about one quarter of the average, then increases steadily to reach a peak
for individuals aged about 50, and declines thereafter. The values of ½ and ¾2
" are set
to 0.96 and 0.045 (see Huggett, 1996, and the discussion therein). For computational
reasons, the autoregressive process given by (20) is approximated by a nine state Markov
chain with the method proposed by Tauchen (1986).
Finally, following Huggett (1996) and taking the evidence that earnings inequality
6In particular we took the values from the website of Dean Corbae:
http://sites.google.com/site/deancorbae/teaching.
7Given the log-normal distribution of e, the mean productivity of cohort j is equal to ¹ zj exp(¾2
j=2),
where ¾2
j is the variance of the logarithm of idiosyncratic productivity among individuals of age j.
12is increasing with age (Heathcote et al., 2005), we set the variance of log-productivity














The elasticity ® is set to 0.3 and the depreciation rate ± is ¯xed at 0.08, so that in the
stationary equilibrium the labor share in income and the values for capital-output and
investment-output ratios re°ect the long-term average for the US economy.
Next, we ¯x public consumption expenditures G at 20% of output and choose the
capital tax rate ¿r to be 0.15, which corresponds to the long-term capital gains rate
in the US in 2008. The replacement rate µ is set to 0.40, which re°ects the average
value in the US in 2006 (OECD, 2009). Finally, we assume that in equilibrium the
interest rate spreads ª1 = rl ¡ r and ª2 = rd ¡ r are equal to 2 percentage points
and 1 percentage point, respectively. The total lending-deposit interest rate spread of
3 percentage points re°ects the observed 1980-2008 average spread of 3.1 percentage
points between the interest rate charged by US banks on loans to prime private sector
customers minus the treasury bill interest rate.8
3.2 Solution of the benchmark model
The stationary equilibrium values for key variables and ratios are as follows (Table
2). The shares of private consumption, investment and government spending in GDP
are 56.2%, 23.8% and 20.0%, respectively. The capital-output ratio amounts to 2.643,
8According to the World Bank data: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RISK.
13which implies the market real interest rate at 3.3%. The resulting deposit and lending
rates are 2.3% and 5.3%. The income tax and social contribution rates consistent with
balanced budget conditions (13) and (15) are equal to 27.5% and 8.4%, respectively.
Finally, the value of household credit amounts to 14.3% of GDP and the population
with non-positive ¯nancial assets constitute 32.5% of total population.
It is worthy to mention that our model does not distinguish between consumption of
durables (e.g. housing) and nondurables. Therefore, the value of 14.3% of GDP might
be interpreted here as a level of consumer credit in the economy rather than the value
of mortgage loans. In fact, the volume of housing loans in developed countries (58% of
GDP on average in the EU in 2009) is usually a multiple of the calculated household
credit, while the level of consumer credit is often close to this value (8.6% on average
in the EU in 2009).
Figure 2 presents life-cycle paths for the average values of key model variables. It
shows that the average income of workers, which is de¯ned as the sum of labor income,
capital income and transfers, is hump-shaped. This is mostly due to the shape of the
deterministic component of idiosyncratic productivity ¹ zj (see left panel of Figure 1).
The average income of retirees is almost °at. The lifetime pro¯le of consumption is also
hump-shaped, but its variability is much lower than that of income. It can be noticed
that the consumption pro¯le to some extent tracks the pro¯le of income, which is in
line with the empirical evidence presented by Carroll and Summers (1989).
As regards the path of the average net ¯nancial position and the average value of
credit, it re°ects the life-cycle pro¯les of income and consumption. In initial periods,
when income is relatively low, individuals are taking loans as they expect that their
income will increase in the future. Consequently the share of population with non-
positive ¯nancial position is high. Then, individuals accumulate ¯nancial assets to
protect against expected income decrease in the retirement period. The average value
14of net ¯nancial position reaches a peak for cohorts of age around 60. In the last periods
individuals are using their life-time savings to keep consumption above their income,
which is determined by the value of pension.
4 Simulation results
This section presents the results of a series of simulations that were aimed to quantify
how di®erent factors in°uence the amount of household credit in the economy. In
particular, we investigate how life-cycle decisions of households depend on:
² the cost-e®ectiveness of the banking sector;
² individual income uncertainty;
² the persistence of an individual productivity process;
² the generosity of the social security system;
The results are presented in the below subsections.
4.1 Interest rate spread
We start by investigating how the e®ectiveness of the ¯nancial sector, measured by the
lending-deposit interest rate spread rl ¡ rd, a®ects the economy. In all scenarios we
assume that the lending-market rate spread is twice higher than the market-deposit
rate spread, rl ¡ r = 2(r ¡ rd).
An increase of the spread a®ects the economy in the following way. A decrease of the
deposit rate deter individuals from savings. The aggregate value of deposits, and hence
capital, is falling, which leads to an increase of the market rate. As regards the lending
rate, it is rising due to changes of the spread and the market rate. This discourages
individuals from taking loans. As a result, the value of lending to households shrinks.
15The results, which are presented in Table 3 and Figure 3, show that an increase of
the spread from the baseline value of 3 percentage points to 6 percentage points raises
the lending rate from 5.3% to 7.8%, and decreases the household credit to GDP ratio
from 14.3% to 7.2%. Moreover, a decline in the stock of capital means that output,
wages and pensions are lower by about 2%. The decline in the welfare is even more
pronounced, because apart from the fall in income, high spread impedes consumption
smoothing in the life-cycle (see right-upper panel of Figure 3). Finally, according to
the results, in the environment of null spread the aggregate value of household credit
amounts to 27.8% of output.
Apart from the reasons discussed above, a large gap between the interest rate on lia-
bilities and assets may dampen the amount of credit in the economy because households
may use their assets to ¯nance consumption instead of incurring more debt. Moreover,
the high cost of carrying liabilities relative to the return on assets prompts the repay-
ment of existing debt. These channels, which might be signi¯cant in practice, are not
accounted for in our model because individuals are not allowed to have both positive
deposits and positive loans.
4.2 Idiosyncratic productivity uncertainty
In the second set of simulations, we investigate how the volatility ¾2
" of the individual
productivity process e, given by (20), a®ects the economy. Let us emphasize two issues.
First, higher ¾2
" does not alter the transition matrix ¼, but raises the dispersion among
the values from the set E. Second, it leads to a raise in e®ective labor supply L due to
reasons discussed in footnote 7. Consequently, this has a positive e®ect on output, the
average wage and the value of pension (see Table 4).
What is more interesting for our investigation, is how changes in individual un-
certainty a®ect the process of capital accumulation, the level of the real interest rate
16and the amount of credit in the economy. It is well known in the literature that if
individuals are risk averse then an increase in future income uncertainty leads to a
buildup of precautionary savings (see Zeldes, 1989, for a theoretical model and Carroll
and Samwick, 1998, for an empirical evidence). In our model a change of ¾2
" from 0.045
to 0.075 leads to an increase of the capital-output ratio from 2.643 to 2.865, i.e. by
8.4%. Consequently, the market interest rate declines from 3.3% to 2.5%. Even though
the decline in the lending rate, higher uncertainty deters individuals from taking loans,
and the share of household credit in GDP declines from 14.3% to 13.4%. If individual
uncertainty is low, ¾2
" = 0:015, then the value of household credit amounts to 18.9% of
GDP. Finally, it can be noted that consumption pro¯le over the life-cycle is smoother
in the environment of lower uncertainty (see Table 4 and Figure 4).
4.3 Individual productivity persistence
The next set of simulations aim at analyzing how the persistence of the individual
productivity process, measured by parameter ½ from equation (20), in°uences life-cycle
decisions and the value of aggregate variables in the stationary equilibrium. The value
of ½ determines the transition matrix ¼, and given the value of variance ¾2
", it also
de¯nes set E. In order to maintain a sensible comparison, in below simulations we alter
the value of ¾2
" so that the unconditional variance ¾2
"=(1 ¡ ½2) was the same as in the
benchmark economy. This means that the values of set E are kept constant.
The estimates of ½ for the US vary in the literature. According to Floden and Lind¶ e
(2001) the value of ½ is 0.91, whereas Storesletten et al. (2004b) ¯nd evidence that it
is somewhere between 0:94 and 0:96. Moreover, in the subsequent article, the same
authors estimate that ½ is very close and insigni¯cantly di®erent from unity, which
would imply that the productivity process is nonstationary (Storesletten et al., 2004a).
They also show that for any value of ½ > 0:91 their theoretical, life-cycle model is able
17to replicate consumption inequality in the US. For that reason, in our simulations we
consider values of ½ ranging from 0.90 to 0.98.
The e®ects of higher productivity process persistence on the economy are as follows.
An increase in the persistence raises expected life-time earnings of high-productivity
individuals and diminishes expected income of low-productivity individuals. The former
are therefore reducing their precautionary savings, whereas the latter are less interested
in taking loans. The overall impact on the capital-output ratio is negative, which leads
to an increase in the real interest rate. This further leads to a contraction in demand
for credit. In our model a change of ½ from 0.96 to 0.98 leads to a decrease of the
capital-output ratio from 2.643 to 2.543 and an increase of the market interest rate
from 3.3% to 3.7%. Finally, the share of household credit in GDP declines from 14.3%
to 12.9%, even though the share of population with non-positive assets increases from
32.5% to 33.6% (see Table 5 and Figure 5).
4.4 Replacement ratio
In the last set of simulations we analyze the economic e®ects of the generosity of the
pension system. For that purpose we calculate the stationary equilibrium for di®erent
values of the replacement rate of pensions relative to the average net wage earnings,
which is de¯ned by µ in (14).
In our model, changes in the replacement rate alter the uncertainty that individuals
face with respect to their life-time resources. Higher µ means that uncertain income
from labor is exchanged for certain income from pensions and thereby the variability
of the life-cycle income pro¯le becomes lower. As a result, higher µ means that the
precautionary motive to accumulate savings is diminished, which leads to a decline in
the stock of capital. An increase of the replacement ratio from 0.4 to 0.6 decreases the
capital-output ratio from 2.643 to 2.533 and raises the interest rate from 3.3% to 4.2%.
18Even though uncertainty related to future income is lower, higher interest rate deters
young workers from taking loans and leads to a decline in the value of household credit
from 14.3% of GDP to 13.1% of GDP (see Table 6 and Figure 6).
5 Empirical evidence
In this section we test whether the implications of the theoretical model are con¯rmed
by empirical data. For that purpose we model the dependency between household credit
and a set of macroeconomic indicators in two ways. First, we focus on the developments
of household credit in time by using panel data for 36 high and middle-income countries.
Second, due to reasons discussed in the next subsection, we also analyze cross-sectional
data to explain di®erences in the value of household credit among 27 EU countries. In
both cases the most general speci¯cation, which encompasses all other speci¯cations,
is:
cr = ® + ®1 ¢ spread + ®2 ¢ incu + ®3 ¢ pers + ®4 ¢ repl + ¯ ¢ X + ²: (22)
The dependent variable cr = ln(Cr=Y ) describes the logarithm of credit to household to
GDP ratio, spread is the di®erence between the lending and deposit rates (rl¡rd in the
theoretical model), incu and pers are individual income uncertainty and persistence (¾2
"
and ½), whereas repl describes the replacement ratio (µ). In line with the simulations
from the previous section, the expected sign for f®i : i = 1;2;3;4g is negative. Finally,
X denotes a vector of control variables, which includes GDP per capita (gdp cap) or
disposable income per capita (dispinc), real interest rate (rate), unemployment rate
(unemp) and the housing price index (hpi).
195.1 Data
In the two groups of regressions we use two separate datasets. The ¯rst dataset spans
over the 15-year period from 1995 to 2009 and comprises 36 countries, including those
OECD and EU economies for which we were able to collect data on household credit
and its regressors.9. In this case, however, the comparability of banking data is di±cult
to assess due to various accounting standards and aggregation techniques. Moreover,
data for incu and repl were unavailable. For that reason we construct the second
dataset, which consists of 27 EU countries and covers the ¯ve-year period from 2005
to 2009. This dataset includes countries for which ¯nancial standards are uni¯ed to a
large extent and thereby banking data are comparable. Moreover, for this dataset we
were able to collect data for all variables present in speci¯cation (22). However, due to
short time dimension of this dataset, the use of panel data techniques does not seem
well-founded. Consequently, we calculate ¯ve-year averages for all variables and use
these averages as cross-sectional data in our estimations.
Among the variables present in speci¯cation (22), individual income uncertainty
incu and persistence pers as well as the replacement ratio (repl) are not directly ob-
servable. Consequently, we need some observable measures of these variables. We
approximate individual income uncertainty by the GINI coe±cient of earnings because
there should be a strong positive correlation between ¾2
" and the GINI value (see Table
4). In the case of individual income persistence, we measure it by the long-term unem-
ployment rate, which is de¯ned as the fraction of unemployed for over one year in total
unemployment. We believe that this is a good proxy as it re°ects the probability ¼11
9In particular, countries included in the panel are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Cyprus*, Czech Rep.*, Denmark, Estonia*, Finland*, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary*, Iceland*,
Ireland*, Italy, Japan, Latvia*, Lithuania*, Luxemburg*, Mexico*, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Poland*, Portugal, Slovakia*, Slovenia*, S. Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey*, United
Kingdom, United States. Data on the housing price index are not available for countries with asterisk
(*)
20of staying in lowest income state. Finally, we approximate the replacement rate by the
ratio of income from pensions of persons aged 65-74 to income from work of persons
aged 50-59. A detailed description of data sources for all variables is provided in Table
7.
5.2 Estimation results
In our ¯rst set of regressions we focus on the behavior of household credit over time. We
estimate the long-run relationship between household credit and the explanatory vari-
ables with panel cointegration techniques. In particular, we employ the continuously-
updated fully-modi¯ed (CupFM) estimator developed by Bai, Kao, and Ng (2009),
which allows for cross-sectional dependence.10 The choice was motivated by the fact,
that this estimator controls for the correlation among macroeconomic variables in dif-
ferent countries, e.g. due to common business cycles. As a robustness check, we also
applied other methods of estimation such as the continuously-updated bias-corrected
(CupBC) estimator of Bai et al. (2009) or the fully modi¯ed OLS and DOLS estimators
(Kao and Chiang, 2000). Even though the values of the estimated coe±cients vary
depending on the estimation technique, the general results from all methods are quali-
tatively very similar. The results from the other methods are available upon request.
Table 8 presents the results of estimations for 8 di®erent speci¯cations of model 22.
The estimate of parameter ®1, which is related to the interest rate spread, is signi¯cantly
negative in all regressions, even if the real interest rate is included in the model. This
supports the implications of the theoretical model, which shows that changes in the
interest rate spread should dampen the value of loans to households. Since the lending
interest rate is usually approximated by the rate on mortgages (where the collateral
10We thank professor Chihwa Kao for providing us his GAUSS codes, which we adjusted for the
purpose of this research.
21values often exceed the values of loans) and by the rate on loans to prime customers
in other cases, the risk premium is considerably reduced in the spread. Therefore, we
can interpret the estimation result as an evidence of more costly banks providing less
credit to the household sector. As regards the parameter related to individual income
persistence, ®3, its estimates are always negative, but often not statistically signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero. This is also in accordance with the results of simulations from
the previous section, which show that higher income persistence decreases the level of
household credit.
The control variables: GDP per capita (approximating the average level of dispos-
able income to each household) and the housing price index are also signi¯cant in all
speci¯cations and the estimates are of expected sign. In turn, the positive and usually
not signi¯cant correlation between the real interest rate and the value of loans can be
explained by the fact that changes in the spread explain changes in household credit
better than the real interest rate itself. Another control variable, the unemployment
rate, is usually not signi¯cant.
In the second set of regressions we use cross-sectional data to explain di®erences in
the value of credit among 27 EU countries. This allows us to analyze the link between
household credit and a wider range of explanatory variables, as speci¯ed in equation
(22). The results, which are presented in Table 9, are as follows.
The coe±cient related to the spread variable, ®1, is always negative, and sometimes
signi¯cant. This con¯rms our panel data results and the implications of the theoretical
model. The variable incu is somewhat negatively correlated with the dependent vari-
able. The link becomes positive when more control variables are added to the regression,
but remains insigni¯cant. We also experimented with other measures of individual in-
come uncertainty: the income quintile share ratio (income of the 20% richest to income
of 20% poorest), the percentage of working households in the risk of poverty and the
22ratio of the number of households making ends meet without any problems and with
great di±culty. The latter variable was signi¯cant in many speci¯cations, pointing to
the interpretation that a larger income discrepancy reduces the value of loans in the
economy. However, this favorable result should be interpreted with a caution due to
the possible impact of the credit burden on the living conditions of households. As
regards the pers variable, the estimates of ®3 are negative and highly signi¯cant in all
speci¯cations. This result con¯rms the panel results and theoretical model simulations,
which state that the value of household credit is negatively correlated with individual
productivity persistence. For the replacement ratio (repl), the results show that it is
negatively correlated with the value of credit in all speci¯cations, but statistically in-
signi¯cant. Given that the theoretical impact of the replacement ratio on the value
of credit is low11, this result is broadly with what we expect. Finally, from the set of
control variables, only disposable income is signi¯cant in all speci¯cations. The real
interest rate and unemployment are statistically insigni¯cant and their coe±cients are
of wrong sign.
The values of R2 indicate that the variability of household credit among EU coun-
tries can be explained in 38% by di®erences in the interest spread, and in 45% by
di®erences in individual productivity persistence. The contribution of variables incu
and repl in explaining the variance of household credit is low. The value of R2 = 0:62
in speci¯cation (5) indicates, that our theoretical model is relatively supported by the
cross-sectional data for 27 EU countries.
Overall, we believe that both the panel data and cross-sectional regressions support
the results from the theoretical model. This is especially true for the interest rate
spread and individual productivity persistence. The measures of income uncertainty
and replacement ratio for di®erent countries are negatively correlated with the level of
11An increase of the replacement ratio from 40% to 60% decreases the value of household credit
merely from 14.3% of GDP to 13.1% of GDP (see 6).
23household credit, but the link is statistically insigni¯cant.
6 Directions for future work
We have shown that apart from traditional determinants of credit, i.e. real interest
rate and output, there are other factors that have impact on the value of credit in the
economy, such as interest rate spread, individual income uncertainty and persistence
or the structure of the pension system. Moreover, we have provided evidence, that
the implications of the theoretical model are to some degree con¯rmed by the data for
OECD and EU countries. In subsequent research we hope to consider several extensions
to the presented work.
First, in the current setup of the theoretical model we have not addressed the ob-
servation that a large fraction of credit to households is in the form of mortgages. Since
both our results and the results of Egert et al. (2007) or Hofmann (2004) show that house
prices have a signi¯cant impact on the value of credit to households, it seems interesting
to analyze this relation within a theoretical life-cycle model with housing. Even though
this kind of models have already been developed by some authors (Fernandez-Villaverde
and Krueger, 2004; Hintermaier and Koeniger, 2009; Yang, 2009), the question about
the impact of house prices or the minimum value of mortgage down-payment on the
amount of credit in the economy is still relatively unexplored.
Second, in the current setup it is assumed that ¯rms utilize capital that is borrowed
from banks at the market rate. In practice, however, ¯rms ¯nance a large fraction of
their assets with own capital (see Graham and Harvey, 2001, for empirical evidence),
where the cost of external ¯nancing is usually higher than the risk-free interest rate (see
Bernanke et al., 1999, and references therein). As a result, we believe that building a
model with heterogeneous consumers and ¯rms could help expand our understanding of
24the determinants of credit to the private sector. According to our best knowledge this
kind of model has not been developed so far. However, theoretical models describing
¯rms that are heterogeneous in terms of productivity, age or net worth have been
developed (Hopenhayn, 1992; Cooley and Quadrini, 2001, e.g.), so some solution are
present in the literature.
Finally, another potential extension of our work would rest on endogenizing the
interest rate spread. The natural way to do so is to account for credit default risk
and bankruptcy regulations, as it was done e.g. in Athreya (2002); Chatterjee et al.
(2007); Livshits et al. (2007), but also other factors could be taken into account, such as
monopolistic competition in the banking sector. Credit risk incorporated in the model
could be further used to identify credit booms in the banking sector more e±ciently
with econometric models, as it was done in the recent paper of Serwa (2011).
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29Tables and ¯gures
Table 1: Parameterization of the benchmark model
Population growth rate ° 1.01
Number of cohorts J 71
Number of working cohorts J1 43
Share of retirees in adult population 0.247
Discount factor ¯ 0.98
Risk aversion ´ 2
Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity process ½ 0.96
Variance of idiosyncratic productivity process ¾2
" 0.045
Capital share ® 0.30
Depreciation rate ± 0.08
Lending-market rate spread ª1 0.02
Market-deposit rate spread ª2 0.01
Government spending share in output G=Y 0.20
Capital tax rate ¿r 0.15
Replacement rate µ 0.40
Table 2: Solution of the benchmark model
GDP Y 0.436
Capital-output ratio K=Y 2.643
Investment-output ratio I=Y 0.238
Private consumption-output ratio C=Y 0.562
Deposit rate rd 0.023
Market rate r 0.033
Lending rate rl 0.053
Income tax rate ¿w 0.275
Social contribution rate · 0.084
Household credit to GDP ratio Cr=Y 0.143
Share of population with non-positive assets 0.325
30Figure 1: Survival probability and median productivity














Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2009, Sec. 2, Tab. 105) and Huggett (1996).
Figure 2: Life-cycle path for key variables
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31Table 3: Interest rate spread and the stationary equilibrium
Interest rate spread: rl ¡ rd
0.00 0.015 0.03 0.045 0.06
Output (Y ) 0.441 0.439 0.436 0.432 0.427
Deposit rate (rd) 0.030 0.026 0.023 0.020 0.018
Market rate (r) 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.035 0.038
Lending rate (rl) 0.030 0.041 0.053 0.065 0.078
Average net wage ( ¹ w) 0.264 0.262 0.260 0.257 0.253
Pension (b) 0.106 0.105 0.104 0.103 0.101
Capital-output ratio (K=Y ) 2.732 2.689 2.643 2.585 2.528
Household credit to GDP ratio (Cr=Y ) 0.278 0.200 0.143 0.102 0.072
Share of population with non-positive assets 0.383 0.353 0.325 0.298 0.273
Notes: The baseline value of the spread is 0.03.
Figure 3: Interest rate spread and life-cycle decisions
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32Table 4: Individual income uncertainty and the stationary equilibrium
Individual productivity volatility ¾2
"
0.015 0.030 0.045 0.060 0.075
Output (Y ) 0.349 0.391 0.436 0.482 0.532
E®ective labor (L) 0.241 0.263 0.287 0.312 0.339
Market rate (r) 0.046 0.039 0.033 0.029 0.025
Average net wage ( ¹ w) 0.210 0.234 0.260 0.287 0.316
GINI of earnings 31.4 38.6 44.2 48.6 52.4
Pension (b) 0.084 0.093 0.104 0.115 0.126
Capital-output ratio (K=Y ) 2.364 2.527 2.643 2.767 2.865
Household credit to GDP ratio (Cr=Y ) 0.189 0.159 0.143 0.135 0.134
Share of population with non-positive assets 0.325 0.322 0.325 0.330 0.339
Notes: The baseline value of the idiosyncratic productivity volatility is 0.045.
Figure 4: Individual income uncertainty and life-cycle decisions
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33Table 5: Individual productivity persistence and the stationary equilibrium
Productivity persistence ½
0.90 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98
Output (Y ) 0.436 0.437 0.436 0.434 0.428
Market rate (r) 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.037
Average net wage ( ¹ w) 0.260 0.260 0.260 0.259 0.256
Pension (b) 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.103 0.102
Capital-output ratio (K=Y ) 2.680 2.673 2.643 2.611 2.543
Household credit to GDP ratio (Cr=Y ) 0.176 0.158 0.143 0.135 0.129
Share of population with non-positive assets 0.306 0.317 0.325 0.330 0.336
Notes: The baseline value of the productivity persistence is 0.96.
Figure 5: Individual productivity persistence and life-cycle decisions
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34Table 6: Replacement rate and the stationary equilibrium
Replacement rate µ
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Output (Y ) 0.456 0.445 0.436 0.428 0.421
Market rate (r) 0.022 0.028 0.033 0.038 0.042
Average net wage ( ¹ w) 0.287 0.272 0.260 0.248 0.238
Pension (b) 0.057 0.082 0.104 0.124 0.143
Social contribution rate (·) 0.044 0.065 0.084 0.103 0.120
Capital-output ratio (K=Y ) 2.966 2.778 2.643 2.533 2.444
Household credit to GDP ratio (Cr=Y ) 0.152 0.149 0.143 0.137 0.131
Share of population with non-positive assets 0.308 0.318 0.325 0.329 0.332
Notes: The baseline value of the replacement ratio is 0.40.
Figure 6: Replacement rate and life-cycle decisions
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35Table 7: Data sources
variable de¯nition source
Panel data
Cr value of household loans OECD, BIS Data Bank, ECB, national
central banks, Ecowin
GDP nominal GDP World Bank WDI
rl rate on housing loans or loans for primer
customers
BIS Data Bank, ECB, IMF IFS
rd deposit rate IMF IFS, ECB
pers long-term unemployment World Bank WDI, Eurostat
gdp cap log of GDP per capita at const. prices World Bank WDI
r real market rate World Bank WDI
unemp unemployment rate World Bank WDI, Ecowin, OECD
hpi log of the housing price index BIS Data Bank, national central banks and
stat. o±ces, Global Property Guide
Cross-sectional data
Cr value of household loans ECB
GDP nominal gross domestic product AMECO
rl interest rate on housing loans ECB
rd deposit rate ECB
incu GINI coe±cient Eurostat SILC
also: income quantile share ratio S80/S20
ratio of workers at risk of poverty
ratio of households making ends...
pers long-term unemployment Eurostat
repl replacement ratio Eurostat
dispinc gross national disp. income per capita AMECO
unemp unemployment rate AMECO
r real market rate AMECO
Notes: Variables present in model 22 are de¯ned as: cr = ln(Cr=GDP), spread = ln( 1+rl
1+rd) and
rate = ln(1 + r).
36Table 8: Models explaining household loans using panel data from OECD and EU
countries
Speci¯cation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
spread (®1) -3.23 -3.52 -6.56 -6.91 -6.76 -9.07 -4.67
(2.36) (2.57) (5.89) (6.15) (5.99) (6.06) (3.40)
pers (®3) -0.10 -0.02 -0.82 -0.91 -0.72 -0.27 -0.04
(0.46) (0.06) (2.54) (2.86) (2.09) (0.69) (0.09)
gdp cap 3.52 3.39 3.43 2.79 1.648
(14.2) (13.8) (12.5) (7.27) (4.33)
rate 0.94 0.84 -0.13 2.70
(1.60) (1.41) (0.18) (3.98)




N 36 36 36 36 36 36 21 21
T 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Notes: The dependent variable is the log-level of household credit to GDP. The main ex-
planatory variables are the interest rate spread (spread) and the measure of productivity
persistence (pers). Additional control variables are: real GDP per capita (gdp), real interest
rate (rate), unemployment ratio (unemp), and the housing price index (hpi). N is the number
of countries and T is the number of years. The t statistics are presented below parameter
estimates.
37Table 9: Models explaining household loans using cross-sectional data from EU coun-
tries
Speci¯cation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
const 4.52 4.27 4.92 3.28 5.48 2.96
(21.3) (4.98) (18.1) (6.59) (6.62) (2.42)
spread (®1) -27.7 -19.4 -5.22
(3.93) (3.03) (0.65)
incu (®2) -1.72 0.08 2.35
(0.60) (0.04) (1.02)
pers (®3) -2.93 -2.22 -1.54
(4.49) (3.56) (2.22)








N 27 27 27 27 27 27
R2 0.38 0.01 0.45 0.04 0.62 0.72
Notes: The dependent variable is the log-level of household credit to GDP. The main explana-
tory variables are the interest rate spread (spread), the measure of income uncertainty (incu),
the measure of productivity persistence (pers), and the replacement ratio (repl). Additional
control variables are disposible income (dispinc), real interest rate (rate), and unemployment
ratio (unemp). N is the number of observations and R2 is the coe±cient of determination.
The t statistics are presented below parameter estimates.
38